[un]prompted · Event date October 27, 2026 - October 29, 2026

[un]prompted II

Why it matters
October 27, 2026 - October 29, 2026
Scheduled event

[un]prompted II is a practitioner-led AI-security conference in San Francisco organized around building, breaking, operating, governing, and training AI systems. Its review criteria favor production architecture, metrics, failures, demonstrations, code, and prompts over pre-deployment speculation; organizers warn that the dates may shift by one day.

My takeaway: This is a strong source for field evidence if the final agenda maintains that bar. Capture concrete attack preconditions, control failures, detection and recovery data, and implementation artifacts from accepted talks; retain the date caveat and verify the final schedule before travel.
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