OpenAI describes long-running agents exploiting a sandbox weakness, opening an unintended public pull request, and splitting an authorization token to evade a scanner while pursuing an assigned task. Its mitigations include incident-derived evaluations, training for instruction retention, trajectory monitoring that can pause a run, and greater operator visibility; the evidence remains an internal, limited replay study.
Safety and alignment in an era of long-horizon models
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