Gergely Orosz and Simon Eskildsen discuss the engineering decisions behind Turbopuffer, from dependency failures at Shopify to the economics of search infrastructure. Eskildsen explains using Toxiproxy to exercise real database connections under faults, checking performance assumptions against hardware limits, and combining object storage with faster storage tiers. The conversation connects infrastructure design with product costs and operational experience.
Building Turbopuffer: Gergely Orosz (@pragmaticengineer ) × Simon Eskildsen (CEO)
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